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On the Role of Mentalizing
Processes in Aesthetic Appreciation:
An ERP Study
Susan Beudt* and Thomas Jacobsen
Experimental Psychology Unit, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the
Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
We used event-related brain potentials to explore the impact of mental perspective
taking on processes of aesthetic appreciation of visual art. Participants (non-experts)
were first presented with information about the life and attitudes of a fictitious artist.
Subsequently, they were cued trial-wise to make an aesthetic judgment regarding an
image depicting a piece of abstract art either from their own perspective or from
the imagined perspective of the fictitious artist [i.e., theory of mind (ToM) condition].
Positive self-referential judgments were made more quickly and negative self-referential
judgments were made more slowly than the corresponding judgments from the
imagined perspective. Event-related potential analyses revealed significant differences
between the two tasks both within the preparation period (i.e., during the cue-stimulus
interval) and within the stimulus presentation period. For the ToM condition we observed
a relative centro-parietal negativity during the preparation period (700–330 ms preceding
picture onset) and a relative centro-parietal positivity during the stimulus presentation
period (700–1100 ms after stimulus onset). These findings suggest that different
subprocesses are involved in aesthetic appreciation and judgment of visual abstract
art from one’s own vs. from another person’s perspective.
Keywords: neuroaesthetics, aesthetic appreciation, experimental aesthetics, theory of mind (ToM), arts,
event-related potential (ERP), mental chronometry
INTRODUCTION
The role of cognitive processes in the aesthetic appreciation of visual artistic objects has been
discussed within both philosophical and psychological frameworks. Philosophical accounts range
from positing a disinterested aesthetic attitude and excluding cognitive processes from the aesthetic
experience (Stolnitz, 1960) to the belief that thought and reason (especially understanding of an
artwork’s symbolism) are crucial for an aesthetic experience to occur (Goodman, 1985). Recent
accounts from biopsychological research indicate that aesthetic appreciation comprises both
cognitive and aﬀective components.
The aesthetic experience of a piece of art—for example, an artwork in a museum—is believed to
evolve from complex interactions between speciﬁcs of the artwork (e.g., style, content, structural
organization such as symmetry), the observer (knowledge about art and experience with art-related
topics, i.e., expert and lay knowledge, personality traits, cognitive abilities), and the context in
which this experience takes place (e.g., a natural environment, a museum, or an experimental lab,
which result in diﬀerent schema activations). To date, several stimulus-, person-, and situation-
related factors inﬂuencing aesthetic experience and aesthetic behavior have been identiﬁed (for
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an overview see, e.g., Jacobsen, 2010) and assembled within a
framework for the psychology of aesthetics (Jacobsen, 2006).
Accordingly, aesthetic experience can be investigated from the
following seven vantage points: mind, body, content, person,
situation, diachronia, and ipsichronia. Each of these is regarded
as featuring diﬀerent levels of analysis, and they are not
considered to be mutually exclusive. In the present study,
we will emphasize the mind and body perspectives, as these
lie at the heart of neuroaesthetics. These two vantage points
constitute the scientiﬁc paradigm adopted by contemporary
cognitive neuroscience and biological psychology, in which
theoretical models from cognitive psychology are applied
to functional neuroanatomy endeavors. Studies on aesthetic
processing correlate objective measures of neural activity with
reports of individual subjective experience, and are thus deeply
rooted in the classical, pragmatically dualistic approach of
psychophysics (Fechner, 1860).
Aesthetic experience of a visual artistic object appears to
comprise two phases (Locher et al., 2007). Within the ﬁrst few
glances at an artwork, the beholder generates a global impression
of the artwork, more speciﬁcally, a sense of its pictorial content,
structural organization, and semantic meaning, and an initial
aﬀective response to it. If the initially perceived pictorial content
holds interest for the beholder, the second phase will ensue, and
further artwork-related perceptual and semantic information will
be conceived in order to satisfy curiosity and to develop aesthetic
appreciation. Studies investigating the aesthetic experience of
visual artistic objects diﬀer with respect to the role of ﬁxation
patterns. A multitude of those studies use eye movement
patterns as a measure that reﬂects cognitive processing and
indexes task performance. In contrast, in the present event-
related potential (ERP) study, single ﬁxations are used and eye
movements are treated as artifacts in the electroencephalogram
(EEG) recording. Leder et al. (2004) have presented a model of
information-processing stages that allows for an integration of
the sensory, perceptual, and cognitive processes thought to occur
across the two phases involved in aesthetically appreciating and
judging abstract art. These authors discuss how the cognitive
processing of art generates aﬀective aesthetic processing, which
is often positive and self-rewarding, and they consider the
underlying cognitive and aﬀective processes to be somehow
art-speciﬁc and reciprocally linked. According to their model,
there are ﬁve cognitive processing stages: perception, explicit
classiﬁcation, implicit classiﬁcation, cognitive mastering, and
evaluation. Additionally, Leder et al. (2004) propose important
variables that aﬀect the processes at each of the ﬁve stages. The
output of the modulated aesthetic processing comprises aesthetic
emotions and aesthetic judgments.
In the present study, we will focus on domain-speciﬁc
processing of visual modern art as follows. The stages of Leder
et al.’s (2004) model that are of interest for this study will be
further characterized below. The model’s cognitive mastering
stage (which includes “art-speciﬁc interpretation” and “self-
related interpretation”) and its evaluation stage (speciﬁcally, the
“cognitive state” involved) along with the subsequent aesthetic
judgment (one of two results of the evaluation of the cognitive
mastering stage) are of importance for our objective, and in
this model cognitive mastering and evaluation form a feedback
loop. Leder et al. (2004) assume that in order to easily
acquire an understanding of an artwork, self-related cognitive
information (e.g., associations of the artwork’s content with the
beholder’s own situation and emotional state) must be formed. In
Martindale’s (1984) terms, processes eliciting aesthetic pleasure
and understanding are reﬂected by the number and diversity
of stimulus-induced semantic associations and their episodic
memory associations, with a positive correlation between the
number of activated cognitive units and the resulting aesthetic
preference.
Leder et al. (2004) linked their cognitive mastering stage
to Parsons’s (1987) proposed ﬁve-stage model of aesthetic
development. For the present research endeavor, the most
relevant part of Parsons’s (1987) model is stage 3, expressiveness.
This rests on an “awareness of the interiority of the experience
of others [i.e., the artist], and [. . .] [an] ability to grasp
their particular thoughts and feelings,” and it involves “a
corresponding awareness of one’s own experience as something
inward and unique” (Parsons, 1987, pp. 23–24). According to
Parsons (1987), people can respond diﬀerently to the same
artwork because of their diﬀering understanding of it. The latter is
often due to implicit speciﬁc expectations regarding the envisaged
function of a piece of art, its potential inherent qualities, and
feasible judgments of it. Unlike Leder et al.’s (2004) model,
Parsons’s (1987) cognitive developmental model suggests that
the ﬁve stages occur in a certain order, with each step being an
advance over the previous one (allowing for a more adequate
understanding of art), and it does not provide for feedback loops
or a reversed order of the stages. Parsons (1987) proposed that
factors such as the kinds of art encountered and the extent of
encouragement to think about them determine where beholders
wind up in the sequence of stages. Leder et al. (2004) argued
that what makes an experience aesthetic might be its longer
temporal extension that allows for several cycles of feedback and
feedforward information ﬂow between perception-, cognition-,
and emotion-related processes. Thus, Leder et al.’s (2004) model
raises questions regarding order and carry-over eﬀects (Leder and
Nadal, 2014).
Visual artistic objects can be classiﬁed along various
dimensions. Some have visual qualities that are likely to
elicit pleasurable aesthetic experiences. Visual stimuli such as
paintings or natural landscapes may be among these. In contrast,
other objects of visual art such as conceptual artworks (e.g.,
objets trouvés, ready-mades, much represented at modern art
exhibitions like Documenta) might not be prone to generate
a state of aesthetic pleasure by virtue of their visual qualities
alone. Rather, such objects might engage aesthetic appreciation in
terms of an aﬀective experience only as a consequence of further
elaboration on thoughts about the artist’s mental state, that is,
his or her intentions and mental representations during artistic
creation. Therefore, we propose that this attribution of mental
states to others—that is, theory of mind (ToM) processing—while
engaging in art appreciation is an important, if not essential,
subprocess in some episodes. Such processing can enhance the
depth and comprehensiveness of the aesthetic experience in cases
of the former type of art object and can add aesthetic appreciation
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in the ﬁrst place to perceptual processing in cases of the latter
type.
Previous research on neural correlates of aesthetic processing
points out that several general mechanisms are employed,
namely, processes of perception, attention, memory, decision-
making, reward, and emotion (Chatterjee, 2004; Leder et al.,
2004). Given current knowledge about the neural correlates of
those processes, it follows that dynamic interactions of multiple
brain regions in diﬀerent time frames must account for the
emergence of an aesthetic experience (Jacobsen, 2006; Nadal and
Pearce, 2011). However, to date the neural sources and time
frames for the brain regions that speciﬁcally contribute to this
particular network are less charted. In particular, little research
has been aimed at investigating the multiple processing stages
and mental chronometry of the processes underlying aesthetic
appreciation. Such an investigation is best achieved by using ERPs
derived from an EEG on the basis of its high temporal resolution.
In their work in the ﬁeld of experimental aesthetics, Jacobsen
and Höfel (2002) and Höfel and Jacobsen (2003) have examined
the cognitive mechanisms that lead to aesthetic judgment of
stimuli in the ﬁelds of visual art and music. Empirical ﬁndings
suggest that the underlying conceptual structure of aesthetic
experience diﬀers across the two content domains (e.g., Jacobsen
et al., 2004; Istók et al., 2009; Augustin et al., 2011). Here we
present only research ﬁndings for the visual content domain,
focussing on electrophysiological study results. Höfel and
Jacobsen (2001) and Jacobsen and Höfel (2003) had participants
judge abstract black and white graphical patterns within both an
evaluative aesthetic judgment task and a descriptive symmetry
judgment task (for another instantiation of an evaluative and
pragmatic task see, Cupchik et al., 2009). The results of their
studies showed a double dissociation in the temporal course and
the neural sources for both tasks, indicating the existence of two
separate processing stages (Höfel and Jacobsen, 2001, 2007a,b;
Jacobsen and Höfel, 2003); On the one hand, this was construed
from the ERP results for the aesthetic judgment task, showing
ﬁrst a fronto-central negativity at 300–400 ms and later a positive
potential (LPP) peaking at 600 ms after stimulus onset (Höfel and
Jacobsen, 2001; Jacobsen and Höfel, 2003). The ﬁrst deﬂection
was interpreted to reﬂect processes of impression formation, as
the LPP has been reported to represent evaluative categorization
(Cacioppo et al., 1993). On the other hand, symmetry judgments
resulted in a late longer-lasting posterior ERP deﬂection, which
was taken to reﬂect sustained symmetry analysis. The main
ﬁndings of the 2003 study were replicated in a later study that
investigated aesthetic appreciation of faces (Roye et al., 2008).
In another follow-up study, using the same abstract graphical
stimulus material, the authors aimed at examining whether
the pattern of results arose due to judgment categorization
or judgment report. Participants in this study were asked to
misreport their true judgments (false judgment task). As only
the deﬂection of the LPP was aﬀected by the false judgment task
(in contrast to the qualitatively unaﬀected earlier fronto-central
eﬀect, which only showed a 100-ms-later appearance than in the
2003 study), it was concluded that both ERP deﬂections represent
separate processing stages of the aesthetic judgment of graphic
stimuli and that the observed LPP mainly reﬂects evaluative
judgment categorization rather than judgment report (Höfel and
Jacobsen, 2007a). In a further study, Höfel and Jacobsen (2007b)
were able to demonstrate that the early fronto-central deﬂection
was contingent on the intention to make an aesthetic judgment
and that mere aesthetic contemplation did not result in this
deﬂection.
Relating the ﬁndings of these studies to Leder et al.’s (2004)
model, it can be assumed that the assessed ERPs reﬂecting two
separate processing stages involved in aesthetic judgment of the
beauty of abstract graphic stimuli correspond to later top-down
processing stages within this model. More precisely, it could
be argued that, dependent on knowledge and personal taste,
the ﬁrst impression formation (e.g., a beautiful vs. not beautiful
graphic pattern) could correspond to the cognitive mastering
stage reﬂected by speciﬁc fronto-central ERP deﬂections around
300–400 ms after stimulus onset. As to the proposed evaluative
categorization process later reﬂected by the LPP at around 440–
840 ms after stimulus onset, it remains unclear whether this
corresponds to the model’s evaluation stage itself or to the
subsequent aesthetic judgment. It is not yet speciﬁed whether
the aesthetic judgment aspect of the model relates to a non-
overt or an overt judgment within the beholder. This needs to
be resolved in order to integrate those ERP eﬀects reﬂecting
judgment categorization and not judgment report into themodel.
Another recent study that used magnetoencephalography (MEG)
strengthens the notion of two main processing stages in aesthetic
appreciation. Therein, Cela-Conde et al. (2013) found diﬀerent
neural patterns following presentation of art stimuli within an
earlier time window (250–750 ms, associated with an initial
perceptual and semantic analysis) and within a delayed time
window (1000–1500 ms, linked to a more detailed cognitive
appraisal of the artwork).
To the best of our knowledge, research relating aesthetics
and ToM has not yet been conducted. As an important
prerequisite for understanding a wide range of social situations
and interactions, quite a few studies have already focused
on ToM. Reasoning about others’ mental states requires
various functional processes and a reliable set of brain regions
constituting a ToM network (Frith and Frith, 2003; Carrington
and Bailey, 2009; McCleery et al., 2011). Empirical ﬁndings from
electrophysiological and imaging studies suggest three important
brain regions: the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and, most consistently, the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley
et al., 2001; Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004). In this context,
the latter has been linked with the processes of calculating and
representing both self- and other-perspectives.
Electrophysiological studies on ToMprocessing still constitute
a smaller part of this research ﬁeld. Additionally, these studies
often focus on testing ToM development in children rather than
mental chronometry in adults. ERP studies on healthy adults
have mostly adopted true- vs. false-belief reasoning tasks in
contrast to one or two control tasks that don’t involve ToM
reasoning. For the belief/ToM tasks in question, these studies
show late ERP deﬂections (with either positivity or negativity)
time-locked to stimulus onset over anterior areas (Liu et al.,
2009a: late slow wave [LSW] peaking at 800 ms; Liu et al., 2004:
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700–900 ms; Liu et al., 2009b: 775–850 ms; Sabbagh and Taylor,
2000: 300–400 ms, 600–840 ms; Wang et al., 2008: 400–800 ms;
Wang et al., 2010: 300–1500 ms) and posterior areas (Liu et al.,
2009a: right posterior, LSW 600–800 ms; Sabbagh and Taylor,
2000: parietal, 300–400 ms, 600–840 ms). McCleery et al. (2011)
investigated visual perspective taking by asking participants to
judge the correctness of the number of disks seen in a picture
from either the self- or the other/avatar-perspective. For the early
frontal cortex component (FL190), they found longer latencies
for self- than for other-judgments over the right hemisphere and
the reverse pattern over the left hemisphere, as well as larger
amplitudes for self-judgments on inconsistent vs. consistent trials
over the right hemisphere only. Additionally, they observed a
TP450 component over posterior electrodes with longer latencies
for other- vs. self-judgments, larger amplitudes for consistent
vs. inconsistent trials that were larger over the right hemisphere
than over the left hemisphere, and a right lateralization for self-
inconsistent trials only (all other conditions showing a more
bilateral distribution). Similar to the aforementioned studies
on true- vs. false-belief reasoning tasks, McCleery et al. (2011)
also observed an LSW around 600–800 ms over frontal sites,
with mean amplitudes diﬀering for consistent vs. inconsistent
trials over the right hemisphere. The authors suggested that the
latter possibly reﬂects executive functions for the selection of
perspectives by means of inhibitory control.
The ability to discriminate the self ’s emotions and mental
representations from those of others is a key aspect of social
cognition and crucial for successful social interaction and
individual well-being (e.g., Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
Electrophysiological studies investigating the distinction between
self- and other-perspectives have been conducted only within the
last decade. A set of ERP studies on self-referential processing
of stimuli such as faces, names, objects, or diﬀerent word
classes have stressed the notion that the P300 component is
frequently associated with self–other discrimination (for an
overview, see Knyazev, 2013). The P300 component represents a
response to stimuli that are unexpected, salient, or motivationally
relevant (salience detection; Polich and Kok, 1995). Herbert et al.
(2011) investigated the temporal processing stages of self–other
discrimination when silently reading unpleasant, pleasant, and
neutral verbal stimuli. They found that stimulus emotionality
enhanced the ERP amplitudes between 200–300 ms and 300–
400 ms at parieto-occipital electrodes and that self-related
unpleasant stimuli (compared to other- or unrelated unpleasant
stimuli) involved a larger frontal negativity from 350 ms onward.
In addition, a larger positivity over parietal electrodes has been
observed for pleasant vs. unpleasant or neutral words from
450 ms onward. The authors reasoned that for verbal emotional
stimuli, self–other discrimination occurs at higher-order, cortical
processing stages.
Other studies have suggested an even earlier modulation of
ERP components by self-relevance. Using two-sentence social
vignettes with pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral emotional
qualities that were presented from the third- or second-
person perspective, Fields and Kuperberg (2012) observed
an early modulation of P1, N1, and P2 by a self-relevant
context, suggesting top-down attentional eﬀects on early visual
processing. Moreover, the results revealed an LPP (500–800 ms)
that was larger for unpleasant than for pleasant words and larger
for pleasant than for neutral words. There was also an eﬀect of
self-relevance on neutral words (larger LPP for self- vs. non-self-
relevant words), but not on emotional words.
Luo et al. (2013) examined the brain responses of counselors
and control participants to unpleasant and neutral pictures.
Participants were asked to watch the pictures from either the
self- or the other-perspective and to identify the content of
the pictures (with or without human) by pressing a button
(attention assurance task). The behavioral results revealed longer
reaction times (RTs) for the other- vs. the self-perspective and
longer RTs for unpleasant vs. neutral pictures. RTs did not
signiﬁcantly interact with stimulus and perspective. Irrespective
of the stimulus type, the results showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two perspectives. Speciﬁcally, they revealed an N2
component over fronto-central regions with a larger amplitude
for the other- vs. self-perspective (both groups) and a late
positive potential (LPP) over centro-parietal regions with a
larger amplitude for the self- vs. other-perspective (the diﬀerence
occurred only in the counselor group). Compared to neutral
pictures, unpleasant pictures elicited smaller N2 and larger LPP
activations in both groups. According to Luo et al. (2013), this
pattern suggests that the counselors’ self–other distinction began
at an early automatic processing stage and that they were able to
maintain it through the cognitive processing stage.
In some aesthetic episodes, reasoning about the artist’s mental
states will be an essential part of the beholder’s interaction with
an artwork. To date it remains unclear how exactly this kind of
processing could be integrated in the theoretical models that are
outlined above. Under which circumstances and in which way it
will shape the aesthetic responses and aesthetic emotions is just
as little known. In addition it would be interesting to fathom if
ToM processing is also an important subprocess in other content
domains than visual art (e.g., music, literature, design). In view of
the empirical ﬁndings of both experimental aesthetics and ToM
research (and the lack of studies combining both research lines) it
is also not admissible yet to derive a speciﬁc time frame for ToM
to occur in the aesthetic episode, though ERPs reﬂecting higher-
order cognitive processing do indicate later potentials.
In the present study, we investigated the role of mental
perspective taking in processes of aesthetic appreciation of
visual art in a trial-by-trial cuing protocol. Using ERPs derived
from the EEG as a dependent measure, we employed a
scenario approach. In one condition, ToM processing was
induced through an initial familiarization of the participants
with a ﬁctitious artist via narrative text. In this condition,
participants made aesthetic judgments of the images from the
perspective of the imagined artist. In the other condition,
participants made aesthetic judgments of the images based
on their own self-referential thinking. Abstract art images
were chosen as stimulus material. None contained human
ﬁgures or any other determinable objects, to avoid potentially
confounding face or object recognition eﬀects in the cortical
activity. We predicted that preparation for target processing
would diﬀer for the ToM and non-ToM conditions, and
also that the ERPs might reﬂect diﬀerent subprocesses in
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the ToM and non-ToM conditions as well as their mental
chronometry.
MATERIALS AND METHOD
Participants
Twelve volunteers participated in the study (1 female, 11
male; mean age 25.33 years; SD ± 2.57). All participants
were students of non-art subjects and received course credit.
They all reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity,
and no known psychiatric, neurological, or other medical
problems. The right-handedness of all participants was assessed
using an inventory adopted from Oldﬁeld (1971). Prior to
the experiment, they received written information about the
study procedure and gave informed written consent. The study
was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of
the German Psychological Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Psychologie) and the World Medical et al. (2008; Declaration
of Helsinki). Formal ethics approvals for the described kind
of research are not required by the guidelines of the German
Psychological Association or the World Medical Association.
Three additional participants were excluded from further analysis
due to technical problems (online processing channel distortions)
or high rejection statistics.
Apparatus and Stimuli
During the training phases and experimental sessions, the
stimuli were generated by an IBM-compatible computer running
MATLAB R2010a and Psychtoolbox 3 software and were
presented on a 24-inch LCD Monitor. All sessions were
conducted in an electrically shielded and sound-attenuated
experimental chamber (Industrial Acoustics Company GmbH,
Niederkrüchten, Germany). Recording of electrophysiological
data was done on a separate computer running BrainVision
Recorder 1.2 (Brain Products EEG/fMRI hardware). Oﬄine
signal processing was realized on a Linux-based computer
running EEProbe 3.3.122 software (ANT Neuro). In addition to
electrophysiological and stimulus–response data, reaction times,
and missing response data were logged in order to measure
performance but were not included in the later ERP analysis.
Participants were seated at a distance of approximately 1.5 m
at eye height in front of the monitor, resulting in a diagonal
visual angle of 3◦. The abstract images were presented on a
dark gray background in the center of the screen. To make
a response judgment, participants were required to press one
of two response keys (yes/no). They were given a rectangular
keyboard (10 cm × 18 cm; response time resolution <1 ms
time accuracy) with 1.0 cm × 1.0 cm response keys set 8.0 cm
apart (positioned parallel to the long axis of the keyboard, with
left–right key assignment counterbalanced across participants).
Responses were made with the index ﬁngers of the uncrossed left
and right hands, indicating either liking (“gefällt”, via yes button)
or not liking (“gefällt nicht”, via no button) in both the self- and
the artist-condition.
The stimulus set consisted of 290 abstract digital images (40
for practice trials, 250 for experimental trials). Of the images,
110 were provided by a local photographer and artist and 180
were taken from open source web sites. The stimuli were adjusted
to the same dimensions. All pictures were colored and entirely
abstract in nature. Figure 1 illustrates some sample stimuli.
Experimental Design and Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment the participants were asked
to carefully read the instructions for the following procedure,
presented on the screen in front of them and initially asking
them to imagine a certain artist X (“Künstler X”). Further
instructions included a biographical sketch of this ﬁctional artist
which brought into focus important life events and distinct
personality traits (see Supplementary Material for biographical
sketch). The descriptive text was slightly inspired by anecdotal
psychoanalytic narrations about various artists in Hagman (2010)
and by a study of creative style and personality by Gelade (2002).
The German version of the biographical sketch comprises 513
words and the whole text was presented on two instruction
slides. Afterward the participants were asked whether they were
able to place themselves in the position of the artist. They were
further instructed about the two conditions of the experiment,
self (“Selbst”; non-ToM) and artist (“Künstler”; ToM), in which
they had to decide whether a presented abstract image was
liked/not liked by themselves or by the artist, respectively.
Participants were not told that the presented artworks were
the work of the introduced artist X. Thus, within the ToM
condition they were supposed to aesthetically judge artworks of
other unspeciﬁed artists from the perspective of artist X. They
also learned about the corresponding cues (self [Selbst]/artist
[Künstler]) that indicated the following trial’s condition, and
they were given an opportunity to practice the experimental
procedure with a 40-trial practice block containing 10 trials
for each condition (self, artist) followed by 20 trials with
mixed conditions. Finally, ﬁve blocks of 50 trials each, with
the experimental condition (and therefore the participant’s task)
randomly chosen for each trial, were administered. Between the
experimental blocks, participants could take self-paced breaks.
One experimental trial began with one of the two task cues
presented for 1000 ms, indicating whether participants should
judge the presented abstract art stimulus as being liked/not liked
by themselves (cue: self) or as being liked/not liked by artist X
(cue: artist). The latter required the participants to recall the artist
description in order to place themselves in the artist’s position.
The task cue was followed by an interstimulus interval (ISI) of
variable duration, ranging from 1000 to 1500 ms. The subsequent
presentation of the abstract art stimulus lasted at least 3000 ms,
remaining on the screen until a response was given, and was
followed by a 500 ms interval before the next cue appeared
(see Figure 2). During the intervals (between either cue/stimulus
or stimulus/cue), a rectangular frame ﬁlled with light gray
and sized according to the greatest width and height among
all used stimuli was presented, with a centered black ﬁxation
cross.
After the EEG recording was completed, participants were
asked to ﬁll out a post-experiment questionnaire. This assessed
the impact of the manipulation via the artist description, the
diﬃculty of the task and the experimental design, compliance
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of stimuli used in the study. Images by © Reinhard Scheiblich.
with the given instructions, potential problems that evolved
during the experiment, and the general pleasantness of the
experiment. The entire session lasted about 90 min, including
approximately 40 min for electrode preparation.
Electrophysiological Recordings
The EEG (Ag/AgCl electrodes) was continuously recorded
from 25 standard scalp locations according to the 10–20
system (three midline electrodes: Fz/Cz/Pz, and 11 electrodes
over each hemisphere: FP1/FP2, F3/F4, F7/F8, FC1/FC2,
FC5/FC6, C3/C4, CP1/CP2, CP5/CP6, P3/P4, P7/P8, O1/O2)
and from the left and right mastoids. The ground electrode
was placed at the FCz location, and the nose tip was used as
online-reference electrode. Electroocular activity was recorded
with two bipolar channels. For the vertical electrooculogram
(VEOG), supra- and infraorbital electrodes of the right
eye were used, and for the horizontal electrooculogram
(HEOG), two electrodes placed lateral to the outer canthi
of both eyes were used. Impedances were kept below
5 k. All channels were ampliﬁed (with low cutoﬀ: 0.1 Hz,
high cutoﬀ: 1000 Hz) and recorded at a 500 Hz sampling
rate.
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic demonstration of the experimental procedure.
Data Analysis
The continuous EEG records were band-pass ﬁltered with a ﬁnite
impulse response ﬁlter with the following speciﬁcations: 8719
points, critical high-pass frequency of 0.1 Hz, and critical low-
pass frequency of 10 Hz (CUE interval, referring to EEG data
recorded between cue onset and picture onset) and 20 Hz (PIC
interval, referring to EEG data recorded between picture onset
and response button press). Artifact rejection was realized with
a standard deviation criterion in a sliding window of 200 ms
(all channels 30 μV), resulting in an exclusion of contaminated
epochs from further analysis.
Diﬀerent time windows were chosen for analyzing cue and
picture processing following artifact rejection. For the analysis of
cue processing, epochs of 1000ms time-locked to (and preceding)
picture onset were extracted and averaged separately for each
of the two conditions (ToM/non-ToM). Application of high-
pass ﬁltering prior to averaging attenuated DC oﬀset and low-
frequency components, which was used as alternative for baseline
correction for the CUE interval (see e.g., Widmann et al., 2015).
For the analysis of picture processing (PIC Interval), epochs of
2200 ms time-locked to (and following) picture onset, including
a 200 ms pre-target stimulus/picture baseline, were extracted and
averaged separately for each of the two conditions (ToM/non-
ToM) and for each of the two key presses (like/don’t like). Grand
averages were computed from the individual subject averages.
The ERP quantiﬁcation routine comprised the following steps,
with all analysis based on the individual mean amplitude in the
given time window at the speciﬁed electrode locations. Visual
inspection led to the identiﬁcation of substantial eﬀects, and for
the corresponding time windows a repeated-measures analysis
of variance (rmANOVA) was conducted. For the CUE interval,
a statistical window of 700 ms to 330 ms preceding picture
onset was selected, and for the PIC interval, a statistical window
of 700 ms to 1100 ms after picture onset was selected. For
the CUE interval, mean amplitude values were subjected to
an ANOVA with repeated measures on the factors Condition
(non-Tom/Tom), Anterior–posterior distribution (F-line, C-line,
P-line), and Laterality (left [F3, C3, P3], midline, right [F4, C4,
P4]). Additionally, a fourth factor, Answer (like/don’t like), was
included in the repeated-measures ANOVA conducted for the
PIC interval. Nine electrodes were used for data analysis in a
3 × 3 grid. Further analyses comprised post hoc t-tests to localize
the eﬀects, with adjustment for multiple pairwise comparisons
using Bonferroni correction. The level of the type 1 error was
set to p < 0.05. Where the assumption of sphericity is violated,
Greenhouse-Geiser (G-G) corrected degrees of freedom and G-G
epsilon (ε) values are reported. Only signiﬁcant results involving
the factor Condition are reported and discussed within the text of
this article.
RESULTS
Behavioral Analysis
Mean response times for the subject answer like were 1441 ms
(SD = 267.12) in the ToM condition and 1683 ms (SD = 691.65)
in the non-ToM condition, and for answer don’t like they were
1320 ms (SD = 232.62) in the ToM condition and 1180 ms
(SD= 188.56) in the non-ToM condition. The judgment latencies
were analyzed through an ANOVA with repeated measures on
the two factors Answer (like/don’t like) and Condition (non-
Tom/Tom), which showed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for the factor
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answer (F1,11 = 11.56, MSE = 1.17, p = 0.006). Post hoc tests
indicated a shorter mean response time for negative answers
(M = 1250 ms) than for positive answers (M = 1562 ms).
Overall response frequencies varied between the conditions, with
Nlike = 768 and Ndon’t like = 945 for ToM and Nlike = 470 and
Ndon’t like = 1297 for non-ToM. Statistical analysis revealed no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between crosstab cells.
On the post-experimental questionnaire, all participants
conﬁrmed that they were able to perform the required tasks. That
is, on the one hand they were able to concentrate on their own
aesthetic appreciation in order to make a like/not like decision
and a corresponding response for themselves while viewing the
art picture (non-ToM condition), and on the other hand they
were also able to place themselves in artist X’s position in order to
make a like/not like decision and a corresponding response while
viewing the art picture (ToM condition).
Electrophysiological Data
Cue Interval
Before ERP computation, on average 25.48% (ToM)/26.20%
(non-ToM) of the trials per participant were rejected. On
average 91 (SD = 17.23) and 94 (SD = 22.40) epochs per
participant, for ToM and non-ToM conditions, respectively,
were used for further analysis. For the time window between
700 and 330 ms preceding picture onset, it was tested whether
the ERP responses within the two conditions, ToM and non-
ToM, diﬀered in amplitude. The repeated-measures ANOVA
comprising the three factors Condition, Anterior–posterior
distribution, and laterality revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of
the factor Condition (F1,11 = 5.18, p = 0.044, η2p = 0.32).
We observed a higher negative mean amplitude within the
ToM condition (M = −3.04 μV) compared to the non-ToM
condition (M = −2.24 μV). This eﬀect was shown to be
distributed diﬀerently over anterior/posterior scalp locations.
The interaction eﬀect between the factors Condition and
Anterior–posterior distribution was signiﬁcant (F1,14 = 7.28,
p = 0.013, ε = 0.63, η2p = 0.40). Following up on this interaction,
we observed higher negative mean amplitudes within the ToM
condition (M = −2.83μV) compared to the non-ToM condition
(M = −1.94μV) for C-line and higher negativemean amplitudes
within the ToM condition (M = −4.26 μV) compared to the
non-ToM condition (M = −3.25 μV) for P-line (Figure 3).
In addition, the threefold interaction of the factors Condition,
Anterior–posterior distribution, and Laterality was signiﬁcant
(F4,44 = 2.89, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.21).
Furthermore, the general ANOVA resulted in condition-
independent main eﬀects relating to the distribution of voltages
measured across the scalp. Accordingly, there were signiﬁcant
main eﬀects for Anterior–posterior distribution (F1,13 = 26.92,
p < 0.001, ε = 0.57, η2p = 0.71) and Laterality (F2,22 = 13.09,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.54).
Picture Interval
Before ERP computation, on average 19.76% (ToM)/22.27%
(non-ToM) trials were rejected per participant. Thus, on average
99 (SD = 18.10) and 99 (SD = 23.50) epochs per participant,
for ToM and non-ToM conditions, respectively, were used
for further analysis. Based on previous ﬁndings and visual
inspection, the time window 700–1100 ms after picture onset
was further investigated to test for a mean amplitude diﬀerence
in ERP responses between the two conditions non-ToM and
ToM. A repeated-measures ANOVA comprising the four
factors Condition, Answer, Anterior–posterior distribution,
and Laterality was conducted for the corresponding time
window. The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect
for the factors Condition*Anterior–posterior distribution
(F2,22 = 5.50, p= 0.012, η2p = 0.33). Subsequent post hoc analyses
indicated that this interaction eﬀect arose from signiﬁcant
lower mean amplitude in the non-ToM condition compared
to the ToM condition for central electrodes (mean diﬀerence
for C-line MDnon-ToM−ToM = −1.25, p = 0.042) and posterior
electrodes (mean diﬀerence for P-lineMDnon-ToM−ToM = −1.12,
p = 0.033). More precisely, lower mean amplitudes were found
for left lateralized and central recording sites than for right
hemisphere recordings (mean diﬀerence MDright−left = −1.43,
p = 0.001; mean diﬀerence MDright−central = −1.42, p < 0.001;
see Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
The present ERP study investigated the role of mental perspective
taking in aesthetic appreciation of visual art. Participants were
introduced to the life and attitudes of a ﬁctitious artist via a
narrative description and subsequently asked to aesthetically
appraise (like/not like judgments via button presses) abstract art
images either from their own perspective or from the imagined
perspective of this artist. We expected that preparation for the
processing of art images would diﬀer for the ToM and non-ToM
tasks. The applied technique of EEG analysis yields information
about neurophysiological correlates of mental processes with
a high temporal resolution, allowing for identiﬁcation of
subprocesses. Thus, ERPs elicited within the time window
preceding response release (like/not like judgment) may reﬂect
diﬀerent subprocesses in the two conditions, along with their
mental chronometry. With regard to the electrophysiological
results, we obtained enhanced negative ERP waves in preparation
for aesthetically appraising the abstract art images in the ToM
condition. To our knowledge, the present study is the ﬁrst to
investigate the role of mental state attributions in the aesthetic
appreciation of visual art.
Differential Pattern for Speed of Liking
Ratings
This study’s behavioral results show that the latencies of like/not
like judgments diﬀered signiﬁcantly for the two evaluative
judgment responses. Participants responded more quickly when
they did not like the abstract art stimuli than when they liked
it. Reaction times were fastest and slowest when making the
evaluative judgment from the participant’s own perspective.
However, the analyses revealed no signiﬁcant interaction between
answers and conditions, thus indicating that the diﬀerence
between like/not like responses described above was observed
irrespective of the adopted perspective. A similar pattern showing
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FIGURE 3 | Grand-average ERP waveforms, referenced to the nose, elicited at nine scalp electrodes and two EOG channels during preparation
period time-locked to picture onset. Voltage map representing the difference between the non-ToM and ToM condition during the time interval 0.700 to 0.330 s
before picture onset. Illustrated are waveforms for the two conditions (non-ToM, ToM) and the difference wave (non-ToM−ToM). The time interval used to plot the
voltage map is indicated by a gray shade (shown at electrode with highest mean amplitude difference).
substantially faster judgment response for like vs. don’t like was
only found when participants judged the aesthetic value and
the harmonic correctness of chord sequences (Müller et al.,
2010). Other studies that investigated aesthetic processing within
the visual content domain and that are therefore more suitable
for comparison with our study results, did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between response latencies for like vs. don’t like
responses. With regard to response latencies for the ToM vs. the
control condition, empirical results show a quite heterogeneous
pattern with either faster (e.g., Saxe et al., 2004; Luo et al.,
2013) or slower (e.g., Kana et al., 2009) response times for the
corresponding ToM condition, or even no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
(Wang et al., 2010). This may be partially due to very diﬀerent
experimental designs with varying task diﬃculty between
the conditions, which would potentially demand diﬀerent
emotional and cognitive processing eﬀorts for (successful) task
fulﬁllment.
Condition-dependent Modulation of
Prestimulus ERPs during Preparation for
Evaluative Judgment
This study showed that during the processing of the cue
interval, there were signiﬁcant condition-dependent diﬀerences
in ERP waves. Under closer scrutiny, cue-induced adoption of
another’s perspective compared to one’s own perspective elicited
a stronger negativity in preparation for the upcoming abstract
art stimulus and response selection. This possibly implicates
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FIGURE 4 | Grand-average ERP waveforms, referenced to the nose, elicited at nine scalp electrodes and two EOG channels in response to the onset
of an abstract art image, time-locked to picture onset. Illustrated are waveforms for the two conditions (non-ToM, ToM) and the difference wave
(non-ToM−ToM). The time interval used to plot the voltage map is indicated by a gray shade (shown at electrode with highest mean amplitude difference). The
voltage map represents the difference between the non-ToM and ToM condition during the time interval 0.700 to 1.100 s after picture onset.
that once participants become aware of the perspective they
should adopt, diﬀerent processing modes might be activated,
depending on the perspective. More speciﬁcally, this condition-
dependent diﬀerence was characterized as a slow negative-going
wave over central and parietal recording sites. We suggest
that these ERP waves can be associated with the contingent
negative variation (CNV). This well-studied component is
observed during presentation of two contingent stimuli and
is perceived as an electrophysiological correlate of motor and
cognitive preparatory processes. Diﬀerences in CNV amplitude
have been related to factors such as diﬀerences in task diﬃculty
and eﬀort investment (Lorist et al., 2000; Falkenstein et al.,
2003). Hence, the higher ERP negativity elicited in the ToM
condition might represent a greater amount of eﬀort required to
accomplish the subsequent task. We assume that this negative
deﬂection representing preparation processing might be even
more pronounced if the cue-target ISI were set as ﬁxed. In
task-switching studies (see Kiesel et al., 2010, for an overview),
preparation eﬀects, as indexed by performance facilitation due
to the elongation of an advanced preparation interval, tend to
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be more pronounced when the preparation intervals are kept
constant rather than varied within blocks of trials (e.g., Rogers
andMonsell, 1995). Thus, the jittered ISI implemented within the
present study may have added to a diminished CNV deﬂection.
ERP Effects of the Adopted Perspective
Preceding the participants’ motor response indicating liking
or disliking of the abstract art image, we discovered a slow
negative-going wave that diﬀered between the ToM and non-
ToM conditions (Figure 4). The negative deﬂection was observed
to be stronger when participants were deliberating their own
picture evaluation rather than the imagined evaluation of
another person, i.e., the ﬁctitious artist. This eﬀect evolved
mainly from left lateralized, central, and posterior recording
sites. The neural responses associated with the diﬀerent
judgments (like/don’t like) did not diﬀer substantially preceding
the motor response. Thus, the diﬀerence between the ERP
responses for the two perspective conditions did not seem
to be modulated by the kind of the corresponding evaluative
judgment.
In contrast, previous ERP studies investigating the
chronometry of aesthetic processing have reported slow
late positive-going potentials within similar time windows
for the aesthetic evaluation task (e.g., music: Brattico
et al., 2010, 2013; abstract graphic patterns: Jacobsen and
Höfel, 2003). However, visual inspection of their presented
grand-average ERP waves indicates that the reported LPPs
seemed to be followed by a sustained negativity as well.
For the latter potential, neither signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between like and dislike answers nor between diﬀerent
judgment tasks—aesthetic judgment tasks versus correctness
judgments (Brattico et al., 2010, 2013) or versus symmetry
judgment tasks (Jacobsen and Höfel, 2003)—could be
reported.
Late negative ERP eﬀects have also rarely been reported
in studies investigating the neural time course of ToM
processing and, more speciﬁcally, the diﬀerences between belief
reasoning and reality reasoning. Wang et al. (2008) used
electrophysiological recording to investigate neural substrates of
false-belief versus true-belief reasoning in a deceptive appearance
task. Compared with true-belief reasoning, for which information
can simply be derived from reality with no ToM reasoning
required to accomplish the task, a signiﬁcantly decreased
amplitude of the late negative component (LNC, 400–800 ms)
over centro-frontal sites was elicited by false-belief reasoning (for
which ToM reasoning is required). Drawing parallels between
their task design and the two tasks that were integrated in the
present study, it can be suggested that in both studies, there is
a decreased amplitude of the late negative component for the
ToM perspective compared to the self- or reality-perspective.
It must be noted that in the present study, diﬀerences were
obtained at centro-parietal sites. Wang et al. (2008) concluded
that in their study the brain was not able to diﬀerentiate true-
and false-belief reasoning before 400 ms after stimulus onset
and that the subsequent decreased amplitude may reﬂect a
decoupling mechanism that distinguishes between mental states
and reality (also see Liu et al., 2004). Given this, the ToM and
non-ToM tasks contrasted in the present study and thus also
the obtained results cannot be fairly compared with the study
results based on contrasting true- versus false-belief reasoning.
Unlike the true/reality reasoning task, the self/non-ToM task is
not characterized by decoupling from mental states, which in
this case are thought to be self-referential. As a consequence,
our own results may be better compared with the ﬁndings
in Wang et al. (2010), where a person perception condition
was added, which could then be contrasted with a ToM and
a scene condition, thereby enabling investigation of a more
diﬃcult task discrimination (ToM and person perception) than
the discrimination often found in established true- or false-
belief reasoning designs. In their study, Wang et al. (2010)
observed that the dissociation of ToM and person perception
emerged considerably later (1000–1400 ms). They concluded
that longer latencies could be explained by diﬀerences in
cognitive diﬃculty. This may possibly be due to a greater
cognitive task demand and also the diﬃculty of the task
discrimination.
Furthermore, integrating results from imaging studies that
stress the involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
in mentalizing processes (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000, 2002;
Vogeley et al., 2001), and the acknowledged involvement
of the ACC in inhibitory processing (e.g., Weissman et al.,
2003; Botvinick et al., 2004) with ERP results found by
Wang et al. (2010), the latter suggested that their LNC
represents the crucial role of inhibition in false-belief
(ToM) reasoning, through inhibiting self-predominating
thoughts. Given that, the late negativity eﬀect in the present
study can also be considered as a decreased negative slow
potential when the ToM versus the non-ToM perspective
is adopted, thereby representing the activation of inhibitory
processes to limit the processing of self-referential mental
states.
The comparability of the present study’s results to previous
experiments in the corresponding research ﬁelds is restricted
due to diﬀerent experimental designs and diﬀerent tested
assumptions. Therefore, it may be argued that the speciﬁcity
of conclusions drawn about the results should be considered
critically. Also, given the eﬀect size of the present results, future
research might be well advised to adjust the size of the participant
sample accordingly.
CONCLUSION
Art reception can be accompanied by an aesthetic experience
involving perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and evaluative
processes. The corresponding research is only at the beginning
stage of considering the possibilities that arise from the adoption
of insights and methods from cognitive psychology and from
cognitive and aﬀective neuroscience. Little is known yet about
how aesthetic experiences are instantiated in the brain and
how information is processed over the time course of an
aesthetic episode and its underlying processes. We argue that
one important cognitive process substantially contributing to
a subset of aesthetic experiences is ToM processing. The
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present study is the ﬁrst to address this speciﬁc issue using a
multimethod research approach involving self-reports, response
times, and the ERP technique. Substantial diﬀerences in ERP
mean amplitudes for the ToM and self-perspective conditions
were found both in preparation for appreciating an art image
and later preceding an overt aesthetic judgment. We take our
results to reﬂect a higher cognitive demand when preparing
for aesthetic appreciation from another’s perspective, and to
indicate diﬀerent subprocesses underlying aesthetic appreciation
of visual art during the modes of mental state attribution and
self-referential processing. Mentalizing processes occur in an
extended time window between initial perceptual and eventual
decision processes.
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